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Abstract—We show that it is possible to achieve information
theoretic location privacy for secondary users (SUs) in database-
driven cognitive radio networks (CRNs) with an end-to-end delay
less than a second, which is significantly better than that of
the existing alternatives offering only a computational privacy.
This is achieved based on a keen observation that, by the
requirement of Federal Communications Commission (FCC), all
certified spectrum databases synchronize their records. Hence, the
same copy of spectrum database is available through multiple
(distinct) providers. We harness the synergy between multi-
server private information retrieval (PIR) and database-driven
CRN architecture to offer an optimal level of privacy with
high efficiency by exploiting this observation. We demonstrated,
analytically and experimentally with deployments on actual cloud
systems that, our adaptations of multi-server PIR outperform
that of the (currently) fastest single-server PIR by a magnitude
of times with information theoretic security, collusion resiliency
and fault-tolerance features. Our analysis indicates that multi-
server PIR is an ideal cryptographic tool to provide location
privacy in database-driven CRNs, in which the requirement of
replicated databases is a natural part of the system architecture,
and therefore SUs can enjoy all advantages of multi-server PIR
without any additional architectural and deployment costs.
Index Terms—Database-driven cognitive radio networks, lo-
cation privacy, dynamic spectrum access, private information
retrieval.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth of connected wireless devices has dra-
matically increased the demand for wireless spectrum and
led to a serious shortage in spectrum resources. Cognitive
radio networks (CRN s) [1] have emerged as a promising
technology for solving this shortage problem by enabling
dynamic spectrum access (DSA), which improves the spectrum
utilization efficiency by allowing unlicensed/secondary users
(SU s) to exploit unused spectrum bands (aka spectrum holes
or white spaces) of licensed/primary users (PU s).
Currently, two approaches are being adopted to identify
these white spaces: spectrum sensing and geolocation spectrum
databases. In the spectrum sensing-based approach, SU s need
to sense the PU channel to determine whether the channel is
available for opportunistic use. The spectrum database-based
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approach, on the other hand, does not require that SU s perform
sensing to check for spectrum availability. It instead requires
that SU s query a database (DB) to learn about spectrum
opportunities in their vicinity. This approach, already promoted
and adopted by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC), was introduced as a way to overcome the technical hur-
dles faced by the spectrum sensing-based approaches, thereby
enhancing the efficiency of spectrum utilization, improving
the accuracy of available spectrum identification, and reducing
the complexity of terminal devices [2]. Moreover, it pushes
the responsibility and complexity of complying with spectrum
policies to DB and eases the adoption of policy changes by
limiting updates to just a handful number of databases, as
opposed to updating large numbers of devices [3].
FCC has designated nine entities (e.g. Google [4], iconec-
tiv [5], and Microsoft [6]) as TV bands device database admin-
istrators which are required to follow the guidelines provided
by PAWS (Protocol to Access White Space) standard [3].
PAWS sets guidelines and operational requirements for both
the spectrum database and the SU s querying it. These include:
SU s need to be equipped with geo-location capabilities, SU s
must query DB with their specific location to check channel
availability before starting their transmissions, DB must reg-
ister SU s and manage their access to the spectrum, DB must
respond to SU s’ queries with the list of available channels in
their vicinity along with the appropriate transmission param-
eters. As specified by PAWS standard, SU s may be served
by several spectrum databases and are required to register to
one or more of these databases prior to querying them for
spectrum availability. The spectrum databases are reachable via
the Internet, and SU s querying these databases are expected
to have some form of Internet connectivity [7].
A. Location Privacy Issues in Database-Driven CRN s
Despite their effectiveness in improving spectrum utilization
efficiency, database-driven CRN s suffer from serious security
and privacy threats. Since they could be seen as a variant
of of location based service (LBS), the disclosure of location
information of SU s represents the main threat to SU s when
it comes to obtaining spectrum availability from DBs. This is
simply because SU s have to share their locations with DBs to
obtain spectrum availability information in their vicinity. The
fine-grained location, when combined with publicly available
information, can easily reveal other personal information about
an individual including his/her behavior, health condition,
personal habits or even beliefs. For instance, an adversary can
learn some information about the health condition of a user by
observing that the user regularly goes to a hospital for example.
The frequency and duration of these visits can even reveal the
seriousness of a user illness and even the type of illness if the
location corresponds to that of a specialty clinic. The adversary
could even sell this information to pharmaceutical advertisers
without the user’s consent.
Being aware of such potential privacy threats, SU s may
refuse to rely on DB for spectrum availability information,
which may present a serious barrier to the adoption of database-
based CRN s, and to the public acceptance and promotion of
the dynamic spectrum sharing paradigm. Therefore, there is a
critical need for developing techniques to protect the location
privacy of SU s while allowing them to harness the benefits of
the CRN paradigm without disrupting the functionalities that
these techniques are designed for to promote dynamic spectrum
sharing.
B. Research Gap and Objectives
Despite the importance of the location privacy issue in
CRN s, only recently has it started to gain interest from the
research community [8]. Some works focus on addressing this
issue in the context of collaborative spectrum sensing [9]–
[13]; others address it in the context of dynamic spectrum
auction [14]. Protecting SU s’ location privacy in database-
driven CRN s is a more challenging task, merely because SU s
are required, by protocol design, to provide their physical
location to DB to learn about spectrum opportunities in their
vicinities. The existing location privacy preservation techniques
for database-driven CRN (e.g., [2], [15]–[18]) generally rely
on three main lines of privacy preserving technologies, (i) k-
anonymity [19], (ii) differential privacy [20] and (iii) single-
server Private Information Retrieval (PIR) [21]. However, the
direct adaptation of k-anonymity based techniques have been
shown to yield either insecure or extremely costly results [22].
The solutions adapting differential privacy (e.g., [18]) not only
incur a non-negligible overhead, but also introduce a noise
over the queries, and therefore they may negatively impact the
accuracy of spectrum availability information.
Among these alternatives, single-server PIR seems to be the
most popular alternative in the context of CRN s. PIR tech-
nology is a suitable choice for database-driven CRN s, as it
permits privacy preserving queries on a public database, and
therefore can enable a SU to retrieve spectrum availability
information from the database without leaking his/her location
information. However, single-server PIR protocols rely on
highly costly partial homomorphic encryption schemes, which
need to be executed over the entire database for each query. In-
deed, as we also demonstrated with our experiments in Section
IV, the execution of a single query even with some of the most
efficient single-server PIR schemes [23] takes approximately
20 seconds with a 80Mbps/30Mbps bandwidth on a moderate
size database (e.g., 106 entries). An end-to-end delay with
the orders of 20 seconds might be undesirable for spectrum
sensing needs of SU s in real-life applications. Also, some of
the state-of-the-art efficient computational PIR schemes [24]
that are used in the context of CRN s have been shown to
be broken [23]. We provide a discussion about the existing
privacy enhancing techniques and their potential adaptations
to database-driven CRN settings in Sections IV and V.
There is a significant need for practical location privacy
preservation approaches for database-driven CRN s that can
meet the efficiency and functionality requirements of SU s.
C. Our Observation and Contribution
The objective of this paper is to develop efficient techniques
for database-driven CRN s that preserve the location privacy
of SU s during their process of acquiring spectrum availability
information. Specifically, we will aim for the following design
objectives: (i) (location privacy) Preserve the location privacy
of SU s while allowing them to receive spectrum availability
information; (ii) (efficiency and practicality) Incur minimum
computation, communication and storage overhead. The cryp-
tographic delay must be minimum to permit fast spectrum
availability decision for the SU s, and storage/processing cost
must be low to enable practical deployments. (iii) (fault-
tolerance and robustness) Mitigate the effects of system fail-
ures or misbehaving entities (e.g., colluding databases). It is a
very challenging task to meet all of these seemingly conflicting
design goals simultaneously.
The main idea behind our proposed approaches is to harness
special properties and characteristics of the database-driven
CRN systems to employ private query techniques that can
overcome the significant performance, robustness and privacy
limitations of the state-of-the-art techniques. Specifically, our
proposed approach is based on the following observation:
Observation: FCC requires that all of its certified databases
synchronize their records obtained through registration proce-
dures with one another [25], [26] and need to be consistent
across the other databases by providing exactly the same
spectrum availability information, in any region, in response
to SU s’ queries [27]. That is, the same copy of spectrum
database is available and accessible to the SU s via multiple
(distinct) spectrum database administrators/providers. Is it
possible exploit this observation to achieve efficiency location
preservation techniques for database-driven CRN ?
In practice, as stated in PAWS standard [3], SU s have the
option to register to multiple spectrum databases belonging to
multiple service providers. Currently, many companies (e.g.
Google [4], iconectiv [5], etc) have obtained authorization
from FCC to operate geo-location spectrum databases upon
successfully complying to regulatory requirements. Several
other companies are still underway to acquire this authorization
[28]. Thus, it is more natural and realistic to take this fact into
consideration when designing privacy preserving protocols for
database-based CRN s. Based on this observation, our main
contribution is as follows:
Our Contribution: To the best of our knowledge, we are
the first to exploit the observation that multiple copies of
spectrum DBs are available by nature in database-driven
CRN s, and therefore it is possible to harness multi-server
PIR techniques [21], [29] that offer information-theoretic
privacy with substantial efficiency advantages over single-
server PIR. We show, analytically and experimentally with
TABLE I: Performance Comparison
Scheme Comm.
Delay
Privacy
DB SU end-to-end
LP -Chor 753KB 0.48 s 0.008 s 0.62 s (ℓ− 1)-private
LP -Goldberg 6000KB 1.21 s 0.32 s 1.78 s t -private ℓ-comp.-private
PriSpectrum [2] 512.8KB 21 s 0.084 s 24.2 underlying PIR broken
Troja et al [17] 8.4KB 11760 s 5.62 s 11766 s computationally-private
Troja et al [16] 12120KB 11760 s 48 s 11820 s computationally-private
XPIR [23] 4321KB 17.66 s 0.34 s 20.53 s computationally-private
Parameters: n = 560MB, b = 560B, r = 106, ℓ = 6, w = 8, k = 6
deployments on cloud systems, that our adaptation of multi-
server PIR techniques significantly outperforms the state-of-
the-art location privacy preservation methods as demonstrated
in Table I and detailed in Section IV. Moreover, our adaptations
achieve the information theoretical privacy while existing alter-
natives offer only computational privacy. This feature provides
an assurance against even post-quantum adversaries [30] and
can avoid recent attacks on computational PIR [23].
Notice that, multi-server PIR techniques require the avail-
ability of multiple (synchronized) replicas of the database.
Therefore, despite their high efficiency and security, they
received a little attention from the practitioners. For instance,
in traditional data outsourcing settings (e.g., private cloud
storage), the application requires a client to outsource only a
single copy of its database. The distribution and maintenance
of multiple copies of the database across different service
providers brings additional architectural and deployment costs,
which might not be economically attractive for the client.
In this paper, we showcased one of the first natural use-
cases of multi-server PIR, in which the multiple copies of
synchronized databases are already available by the original
design of application (i.e., spectrum availability information in
multi-database CRN s), and therefore multi-server PIR does
not introduce any extra overhead on top of the application. Ex-
ploiting this synergy between multi-database CRN and multi-
server PIR permitted us to provide informational theoretical
location privacy for SU s with a significantly better efficiency
compared to existing single-server PIR approaches.
Desirable Properties: We outline the desirable properties
of our approaches below.
• Computational efficiency: The adapted approaches are much
more efficient than existing location privacy preserving
schemes. For instance, as shown in Table I, LP -Chor and
LP -Goldberg are more than 3 orders of magnitudes faster
than the schemes proposed by Troja et al. [16], [17], and 10
times faster than XPIR [23] and PriSpectrum [2].
• Information Theoretical Privacy Guarantees: They can
achieve information-theoretic privacy which is the optimal
privacy level that could be reached as opposed to computa-
tional privacy guarantees offered by existing approaches. In
fact some of these approaches are prone to recent attacks on
computational-PIR protocols [23] and are not secure against
post-quantum adversaries [30].
• Low communication overhead: Both approaches provide a
reasonable communication overhead that is a middle ground
between the fastest computational PIR [23] and the most
communication efficient computational PIR [31].
• Fault-Tolerance and Robustness: Our proposed approaches
are resilient to the issues that are associated with multi-server
architectures: failures, byzantine behavior, and collusion.
Both LP -Chor and LP -Goldberg can handle collusion of
multiple DBs. In addition, LP -Goldberg can also handle
faulty and byzantine DBs.
• Experimental evaluation on actual cloud platforms: We
deploy our proposed approaches on a real cloud platform,
GENI [32], to show their feasibility. In our experiment, we
create multiple geographically distributed VMs each playing
the role of a DB . A laptop plays the role of a SU that queries
DBs, i.e. VM s. Our experiments confirm the superior
computational advantages of the adaption of multi-server
PIR over the existing alternatives.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND MODELS
A. Notation and Building Blocks
We summarize our notations in Table II. Our adaptations of
multi-server PIR rely on the following building blocks.
TABLE II: Notations
DB Spectrum database
SU Secondary user
CRN Cognitive radio network
ℓ Number of spectrum databases
D Matrix modeling the content of DB
r Number of records in D
n Size of the database in bits
b Size of one record of the database in bits
w Size of one word of the database in bits
s Number of words per block
β Index of the record sought by SU
t Privacy level (tolerated number of colluding DBs)
k Number of responding DBs
ϑ Number of byzantine DBs
Private Information Retrieval (PIR): PIR allows a user
to retrieve a data item of its choice from a database, while
preventing the server owning the database from gaining in-
formation on the identity of the item being retrieved [33].
One trivial solution to this problem is to make the server
send an entire copy of the database to the querying user.
Obviously, this is a very inefficient solution to the PIR problem
as its communication complexity may be prohibitively large.
However, it is considered as the only protocol that can provide
information-theoretic privacy, i.e. perfect privacy, to the user’s
query in single-server setting. There are two main classes of
PIR protocols according to their privacy level: information-
theoretic PIR (itPIR) and computational PIR (cPIR).
• Information-theoretic or multi-server PIR: It guarantees
information-theoretic privacy to the user, i.e. privacy against
computationally unbounded servers. This could be achieved
efficiently only if the database is replicated at k ≥ 2 non-
communicating servers [21], [29]. The main idea behind
these protocols consists on decomposing each user’s query
into several sub-queries to prevent leaking any information
about the user’s intent.
• Computational or single-server PIR: It guarantees privacy
against computationally bounded server(s). In other words,
a server cannot get any information about the identity of
the item retrieved by the user unless it solves a certain
computationally hard problem (e.g. factoring a large prime),
which is common in modern cryptography. Thus, they offer
weaker privacy than their itPIR counterparts [24], [34].
Shamir Secret Sharing: This is a concept introduced by
Shamir et al. [35] to allow a secret holder to divide its secret
S into ℓ shares S1, · · · ,Sℓ and distribute these shares to
ℓ parties. In (t , ℓ)-Shamir secret sharing, where t < ℓ, if t or
fewer combine their shares, they learn no information about
S. However, if more than t come together, they can easily
recover S. Given a secret S chosen arbitrarily form a finite
field, the (t , ℓ)-Shamir secret sharing scheme works as follows:
the secret holder chooses ℓ arbitrary non-zero distinct elements
α1, · · · , αℓ ∈ F. Then, it selects t elements σ1, · · · , σt ∈ F
uniformly at random. Finally, the secret holder constructs the
polynomial f(x) = σ0 + σ1x + σ2x
2 + · · · + σtxt, where
σ0 = S. The ℓ shares S1, · · · ,Sℓ, that are given to each party,
are (α1, f(α1)), · · · , (αℓ, f(αℓ)). Any t + 1 or more parties
can recover the polynomial f using Lagrange interpolation and
thus they can reconstruct the secret S = f(0). However, t or
less parties can learn nothing about S. In other words, if t +1
shares of S are available then S can be easily recovered.
B. System Model and Security Definitions
We consider a database-driven CRN that contains ℓ DBs,
where ℓ ≥ 2, and a SU registered to these DBs to learn
spectrum availability information in its vicinity. We assume
that these DBs share the same content and that they are
synchronized as mandated by PAWS standard [3]. We also
assume that DBs may collude in order to infer SU ’s location.
In the following, we present our security definitions.
Definition 1. Byzantine DB: This is a faulty DB that runs
but produces incorrect answers, possibly chosen maliciously or
computed in error. This might be due to a corrupted or obsolete
copy of the database caused by a synchronization problem with
the other DBs.
Definition 2. t -private PIR: The privacy of the query is
information-theoretically protected, even if up to t of the ℓ DBs
collude, where t < ℓ.
Definition 3. ϑ-Byzantine-robust PIR: Even if ϑ of the
respondingDBs are Byzantine, SU can reconstruct the correct
database item, and determine which of the DBs provided
incorrect response.
Definition 4. k -out-of-ℓ PIR: SU can reconstruct the correct
record if it receives at least k -out-of-ℓ responses, 2 ≤ k ≤ ℓ.
Definition 5. Robust PIR: It can deal with DBs that do not
respond to SU ’s queries and allows SU to reconstruct the
correct output of the queries in this situation.
III. PROPOSED APPROACHES
In the proposed approaches, we tailor multi-server PIR to
the context of multi-DB CRN s. We start by illustrating the
structure of the spectrum database that we consider. Then, we
give two approaches, each adapts a multi-server PIR protocol
with different security and performance properties. We model
the content of each DB as an r × s matrix D of size n bits,
where s is the number of words of size w in each record/block
of the database and r is the number of records in the database,
i.e. r = n/b, where b = s × w is the block size in bits. The
kth row of D is the kth record of the database.
D =


w11 w12 . . . w1s
w21 w22 . . . w2s
...
...
. . .
...
w r1 wd2 . . . w rs


We further assume that each row of the database corresponds to
a unique combination of the tuple (lx , ly ,C , ts), where lx and
ly represent one location’s latitude and longitude, respectively,
C is a channel number, and ts is a time-stamp. We also assume
that SU s can associate their location information with the
index β of the corresponding record of interest in the database
using some inverted index technique that is agreed upond with
DBs. An SU that wishes to retrieve record Dβ without any
privacy consideration can simply send to DB a row vector
eβ consisting of all zeros except at position β where it has
the value 1. Upon receiving eβ , DB multiplies it with D and
sends record Dβ back to SU as we illustrate below:
[
0 . . . 0 1 0 . . . 0
]


w11 w12 . . . w1s
w21 w22 . . . w2s
...
...
. . .
...
w r1 wd2 . . . w rs


=
[
wβ1 wβ2 . . . wβs
]
This trivial approach makes it easy for DBs to learn SU ’s
location from the vector eβ as D is indexed based on location.
In the following we present two approaches that try to hide
the content of eβ from DBs, and thus preserve SU ’s location
privacy. The approaches present a tradeoff between efficiency,
and some additional security features.
A. Location Privacy with Chor (LP -Chor )
Our first approach, termed LP -Chor , harnesses the simple
and efficient itPIR protocol proposed by Chor et al. [21]. We
describe the different steps of LP -Chor in Algorithm 1 and
highlight these steps in Fig. 1. Elements of D in this scheme
belong to GF (2), i.e. w = 1 bit and b = s .
Fig. 1: Main steps of LP -Chor Algorithm
In LP -Chor , SU starts by invoking the inverted index
subroutine InvIndex(lx , ly ,C , ts) which takes as input the
coordinates of the user, its channel of interest, and a time-
stamp and returns a value β. This value corresponds to the
Algorithm 1 Dβ ←LP -Chor (ℓ, r , b)
SU
1: β ← InvIndex(lx , ly ,C , ts)
2: Sets standard basis vector eβ ← −→1 β ∈ Zr
3: Generates ρ1, · · · ,ρℓ−1 ∈R GF (2)r
4: ρℓ ← ρ1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ eβ
5: Sends ρi to DB i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ
Each DB i
6: Receives ρi = ρi1 · · ·ρir ∈ {0, 1}r
7: R ← ⊕
1≤j≤r
ρij=1
Dj , Dj is the j
th block of D
8: Sends Ri to SU
SU
9: Receives R1, · · · ,Rℓ
10: Dβ ← R1 ⊕ · · · ⊕Rℓ
index of the record Dβ of D that SU is interested in. SU then
constructs eβ , which is a standard basis vector
−→
1 β ∈ Zr
having 0 everywhere except at position β which has the
value 1 as we discussed previously. SU also picks ℓ − 1
r -bit binary strings ρ1, · · · ,ρℓ−1 uniformly at random from
GF (2)r , and computes ρℓ = ρ1⊕· · ·⊕eβ . Finally, SU sends
ρi to DB i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ. Upon receiving the bit-string
ρi = ρi1 ⊕ · · ·ρir of length r , DB i computes Ri = ρi ·D ,
which could be seen also as the XOR of those blocks Dj in
D for which the jth bit of ρi is 1, then sends Ri back to
SU . SU receives Ris from DB is, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, and computes
R1 ⊕ · · · ⊕Rℓ = (ρ1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ ρℓ) ·D = eβ ·D , which is the
βth block of the database that SU is interested in, from which
it can retrieve the spectrum availability information.
LP -Chor is very efficient thanks to its reliance on simple
XOR operations only as we discuss in Section IV. It is also
(ℓ−1)-private, by Definition 2, as collusion of up to ℓ−1 DBs
cannot enable them to learn eβ , and consequently its location.
In fact, only if ℓ DBs collude, then they will be able to learn
eβ by simply XORing their {ρi}ℓi=1. However this approach
suffers from two main drawbacks. First, it is not robust since
even if one DB fails to respond, SU will not be able to recover
Dβ . Second, it is not byzantine robust; if one or more DBs
return a wrong response, SU will reconstruct a wrong block
and also will not be able to recognize which DB misbehaved
so as not to rely on it for future queries. In Section III-B we
discuss a second approach that improves on these two aspects
but with some additional overhead.
B. Location Privacy with Goldberg (LP -Goldberg)
Our second approach, termed LP -Goldberg , is based on
Goldberg’s itPIR protocol [29] which uses Shamir secret
sharing to hide eβ , i.e. SU ’s query. It is a modification of
Chor’s scheme [21] to achieve both robustness and byzantine
robustness. Rather than working over GF (2) (binary arith-
metic), this scheme works over a larger field F, where each
element can represent w bits. The databaseD = (w jk) ∈ Fr×s
in this scheme, is an r×s matrix of elements of F = GF (2w).
Each row represents one block of size b bits, consisting of s
words of w bits each. Again,D is replicated among ℓ databases
DB i. We summarize the main steps of LP -Goldberg protocol
in Algorithm 2 and illustrate them in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2: Illustration of LP -Goldberg
To determine the index β of the record that corre-
sponds to its location, SU starts by invoking the subroutine
InvIndex(lx , ly ,C , ts) then constructs the standard basis vec-
tor eβ ∈ Fr as explained earlier. SU then uses (ℓ, t)-Shamir
secret sharing to divide the vector eβ into ℓ independent shares
(α1, ,ρ1) · · · , (αℓ,ρℓ) to ensure a t -private PIR protocol as in
Definition 2. That is, SU chooses ℓ distinct non-zero elements
αi ∈ F∗ and creates r random degree-t polynomials f1, · · · , fr
satisfying fj(0) = eβ [j]. SU then sends to each DB i its
share corresponding to the vector ρi = 〈f1(αi), · · · , fr(αi)〉.
Each DB i then computes the product Ri = ρi · D =
〈∑j fj(αi)w j1, · · · ,
∑
j fj(αi)w js〉 ∈ Fs and sends Ri to
SU .
Some DBs may fail to respond to SU ’s query and only k -
out-of-ℓ send their responses to SU . SU collects k responses
from the k responding DBs and tries to recover the record at
index β from the Ris by using the EasyRecover() subroutine
from [29] which uses Lagrange interpolation to recover Dβ
from the secret shares (α1,R1), · · · , (αk ,Rk ). This is possible
thanks to the use of (ℓ, t)-Shamir secret sharing as long as
k > t and these k DBs are honest. In fact, by the linearity
property of Shamir secret sharing, since {(αi,ρi)}ℓi=1 is a
set of (ℓ, t)-Shamir secret shares of eβ , then {(αi,Ri)}ℓi=1
will be also a set of (ℓ, t)-Shamir secret shares of eβ · D ,
which is the βth block of the database. Thus, it is possible
for SU to reconstruct Dβ using Lagrange interpolation as
explained in Section II, by relying only on the k responses
which makes LP -Goldberg robust by Definition 5. Also, the
EasyRecover() can detect the DBs that responded honestly,
thus those that are byzantine as well, which should discourage
DBs from misbehaving. More details about this subroutine
could be found in [29].
Moreover, ϑ DBs among the k responding ones may even be
byzantine, as in Definition 1, and produce incorrect response.
In that case, it would be impossible for SU to simply rely on
Lagrange interpolation to recover the correct responses. Since
Shamir secret sharing is based on polynomial interpolation,
the problem of recovering the response in the case of byzantine
failures corresponds to noisy polynomial reconstruction, which
is exactly the problem of decoding Reed-Solomon codes [36].
Thus, SU would rather rely on error correction codes and more
Algorithm 2 Dβ ← LP -Goldberg(ℓ, r , b, t ,w)
SU
1: β ← InvIndex(lx , ly ,C , ts)
2: Sets standard basis vector eβ ← −→1 β ∈ Zr
3: Chooses ℓ distinct α1, · · · , αℓ ∈ F∗
4: Creates r random degree-t polynomials f1, · · · , fr ∈R
F[x] s.t. fj(0) = eβ [j]’ ∀j ∈ [1, · · · , r ]
5: ρi ← 〈f1(αi), · · · , fr(αi)〉, ∀i ∈ [1, · · · , ℓ]
6: Sends ρi to DB i, ∀i ∈ [1, · · · , ℓ]
Each honest DB i
7: Receives ρi
8: Ri ← ρi ·D = 〈
∑
j fj(αi)wj1, · · · ,
∑
j fj(αi)wjs〉
9: Sends Ri to SU
SU
10: Receives R1, · · · ,Rk
11: if k > t then
12: Dβ ← EasyRecover(t ,w , [α1, ..., αk ], [R1, · · · ,Rk ])
13: else if Recovery fails and ϑ < k − ⌊
√
kt⌋ then
14: S q ← 〈R1[q], · · · ,Rk [q]〉, ∀q ∈ [1, s ]
15: Dβ ← HardRecover(t ,w , [α1, ..., αk ], [S 1, · · · , S s ])
precisely on the Guruswami-Sudan list decoding [37] algorithm
which can correct ϑ < k −⌊
√
kt⌋ incorrect responses. In fact,
the vector 〈R1[q],R2[q], · · · ,Rℓ[q]〉 is a Reed-Solomon code-
word encoding the polynomial gq =
∑
j fjw jq , and the client
wishes to compute gq(0) for each 1 ≤ q ≤ s to recover all the
s words forming the record Dβ = 〈g1(0), · · · , gs(0)〉. This is
done through the HardRecover() subroutine from [29]. This
makes LP -Goldberg also ϑ-Byzantine-robust, by Definition 3,
and solves the robustness issues that LP -Chor suffers from,
however, this comes at the cost of an additional overhead as
we discuss in Section IV.
Corollary 1. LP -Chor and LP -Goldberg directly inherit the
security properties of Chor’s [21] PIR and Goldberg’s [29]
PIR respectively.
IV. EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
A. Analytical Comparison
We start by studying LP -Chor and LP -Goldberg’s per-
formance analytically and we compare them to existing ap-
proaches. For LP -Goldberg , we choose w = 8 to simplify the
cost of computations as in [36]; since in GF (28), additions
are XOR operations on bytes and multiplications are lookup
operations into a 64 KB table [36]. We summarize the system
communication complexity and the computation incurred by
bothDB and SU and we illustrate the difference in architecture
and privacy level of the different approaches in Table III.
As we mentioned earlier, existing research focuses on the
single DB setting. We compare LP -Chor and LP -Goldberg to
these approaches despite the difference of architecture to show
the great benefits that multi-server PIR brings in terms of
performance and privacy as we discuss next. We briefly discuss
these approaches in the following.
Gao et al. [2] propose a PIR-based approach, termed
PriSpectrum, that relies on the PIR scheme of Trostle et
al. [24] to defend against the new attack that they identify.
This new attack exploits spectrum utilization pattern to localize
SU s. Troja et al. [16], [17] propose two other PIR-based
approaches that try to minimize the number of PIR queries
by either allowing SU s to share their availability information
with other SU s [16] or by exploiting trajectory information
to make SU s retrieve information for their current and future
positions in the same query [17].
Despite their merit in providing location privacy to SU s
these PIR-based approaches incur high overhead especially
in terms of computation. This is due to the fact that they
rely on cPIR protocols to provide location privacy to SU s,
which are known to suffer from expensive computational cost.
In fact, answering an SU ’s query through a cPIR protocol,
requires DB to process all of its records, otherwise DB would
learn that SU is not interested in them and would then learn
partial information about the record Dβ , and consequently
SU ’s location. This makes the computational cost of most
cPIR based location preserving schemes linear on the database
size from DB side as we illustrate in Table III. Now this
is not exclusive to cPIR protocols as even itPIR protocols
may require processing all the records to guarantee privacy,
however, the main difference with cPIR protocols is that the
latter have a very large cost per bit in the database, usually
involving expensive group operations like multiplication over a
large modulus [23] as opposed to multi-server itPIR protocols.
This could be seen clearly in Table III as both LP -Chor and
LP -Goldberg require DB to perform a very efficient XOR
operation per bit of the database. The same applies to the over-
head incurred by SU which only performs XOR operations in
both LP -Chor and LP -Goldberg , while performing expensive
modular multiplications and even exponentiations over large
primes in the cPIR-based approaches.
In terms of communication overhead, the proposed ap-
proaches incur a cost that is linear in the number of records
r and their size b. As an optimal choice of these parameters
is usually r = b =
√
n [21], [23], [29], [36] then this cost
could be seen as O(√nw) to retrieve a record of size √nw
bits, which is a reasonable cost for an information theoretic
privacy.
Moreover, as illustrated in Table III, existent approaches
fail to provide information theoretic privacy as the underly-
ing security relies on computational PIR schemes. The only
approaches that provide information theoretic location privacy
are LP -Chor and LP -Goldberg which are (ℓ− 1)-private and
t -private, respectively, by Definition 2. It is worth mentioning
that PriSpectrum [2] relies on the well-known cPIR of Trostle
et al. [24] representing the state-of-the-art in efficient cPIR.
However, this cPIR scheme has been broken [23], [38]. Since
the security of PriSpectrum follows that of Trostle et al. [24]
broken cPIR, then PriSpectrum fails to provide the privacy
objective that it was designed for. However, we include it in
our performance analysis for completeness.
B. Experimental Evaluation
We further evaluate the performance of the proposed
schemes experimentally to confirm the analytical observations.
Hardware setting and configuration. We have deployed the
proposed approaches on GENI [32] cloud platform using the
TABLE III: Comparison with existent schemes
Scheme Communication
Computation
Setting Privacy
DB SU
LP -Chor (r + b) · ℓ nt⊕ (r + b) · ((ℓ− 1) · t⊕) ℓ DBs (ℓ − 1)-private
LP -Goldberg r · w · ℓ+ k · b (n/w) · t⊕ ℓ · (ℓ− 1) · r t⊕ + 3ℓ · (ℓ + 1)t⊕ ℓ DBs t -private ℓ-comp.-private
PriSpectrum [2] (2
√
r + 3) · ⌈log p⌉ O(r) ·Mulp 4√r ·Mulp 1 DB underlying PIR broken
Troja et al [17] 12δ · b O(n) ·Mulp 4√n ·Mulp 1 DB computationally-private
Troja et al [16] ng · π · log2 q + (2
√
n + 3) · ⌈log p⌉ O(n) ·Mulp ng · π · (2Expp+Mulp) + 4
√
n ·Mulp 1 DB computationally-private
XPIR [23] d · (r/α)1/d · C + λ · F d · b 2d · (r/α) · (b/ℓ0) ·Mulp d · (r/α)1/d ·Enc+ d · α · b/ℓ0 ·Dec 1 DB computationally-private
Variables: t⊕ is the execution time of one XOR operation. p is a large prime, and Mulp and Expp are the execution time of performing one modular multiplication, and one
modular exponentiation respectively. π denotes the number of bits that an SU shares with other SU s in [16], ng is the number of SU s within a same group in [16]. δ is the
number of DB segments in [17]. d is the recursion level, α is the aggregation level, C is the Ring-LWE ciphertext size, λ is the number of elements returned by DB , F is the
expansion factor of the Ring-LWE cryptosystem, ℓ0 is the number of bits absorbed in a cyphertext, all are used in [23]. (Enc,Dec) are respectively the encryption and decryption
cost for Ring-LWE cryptosystem used in [23].
percy++ library [39]. We have created 6 virtual machines
(VMs), each playing the role of a DB and they all share the
same copy of D . We deploy these GENI VMs in different
locations in the US to count for the network delay and make
our experiment closer to the real case scenario where spectrum
service providers are located in different locations. These VMs
are running Ubuntu 14.04, each having 8 GB of RAM, 15
GB SSD, and 4 vCPUs, Intel Xeon X5650 2.67 GHz or
Intel Xeon E5-2450 2.10 GHz. To assess the SU overhead
we use a Lenovo Yoga 3 Pro laptop with 8 GB RAM running
Ubuntu 16.10 with an Intel Core m Processor 5Y70 CPU 1.10
GHz. The client laptop communicates with the remote VMs
through ssh tunnels. We are also aware of the advances in
cPIR technology, and more precisely the fastest cPIR protocol
in the literature which is proposed by Aguilar et al. [23]. We
include this protocol in our experiment to illustrate how multi-
server PIR performs against the best known cPIR scheme
if it is to be deployed in CRN s. We use the available
implementation of this protocol provided in [40] and we deploy
its server component on a remote GENI VM while the client
component is deployed on the Lenovo Yoga 3 Pro laptop.
Dataset. Spectrum service providers (e.g. Google, Microsoft,
etc) offer only graphical web interfaces to their databases
that return basic spectrum availability information for a user-
specified location. Access to real data from real spectrum
databases was not possible, thus, we generate random data for
our experiment. The generated data consists of a matrix that
models the content of the database, D , with a fixed block size
b = 560 kB while varying the number of records r . The value
of b is estimated based on the public raw data provided by
FCC [41] on a daily basis and which service providers use to
populate their spectrum databases.
Results and Comparison. We first measure the query end-to-
end delay of the proposed approaches and plot the results in
Fig. 3. We also include the delay introduced by the existing
schemes based on our estimation of the operations included
in Table III. The end-to-end delay that we measure takes into
consideration the time needed by SU to generate the query,
the network delay, the time needed by DB to process the
query, and finally the time needed by SU to extract the βth
record of the database. We consider two different internet speed
configurations in our experiment. We first rely on a high-
speed internet connection of 80Mbps on the download and
30Mbps on the upload for all compared approaches. Then
we use a low-speed internet connection of 1Mbps on the
upload and download to assess the impact of the bandwidth
on LP -Chor and LP -Goldberg , and also on XPIR as well.
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Fig. 3: Query RTT of the different PIR-based approaches
Fig. 3 shows that the proposed schemes perform much
better than the existing approaches in terms of delay even
with low-speed internet connection. They also perform better
than the fastest existing cPIR protocol XPIR. This shows the
benefit of relying on multi-server itPIR in multi-DB CRN s.
Also, and as expected, LP -Chor scheme performs better
than LP -Goldberg thanks to its simplicity. As we will see
later, LP -Goldberg also incurs larger communication overhead
than LP -Chor as well. This could be acceptable knowing
that LP -Goldberg can handle collusion of up-to ℓ DBs, and
is robust in the case of (ℓ − k) non-responding DBs, and
ϑ byzantine DBs, as opposed to LP -Chor . This means that
LP -Goldberg could be more suitable to real world scenario as
failures and byzantine behaviors are common in reality. Fig. 3
also shows that the network bandwidth has a significant impact
on the end-to-end latency. This is due to the relatively large
amount of data that needs to be exchanged during the execution
of these protocols which requires higher internet speeds.
We also compare the computational complexity experienced
by each SU and DB separately in the different approaches
as shown in Table III. We further illustrate this through
experimentation and we plot the results in Fig. 4a, which
shows that the proposed schemes incur lower overhead on
the SU than the existing approaches. The same observation
10 3 10 4 10 5 10 6
Number of records r
10 -4
10 -2
10 0
10 2
SU
 e
xe
cu
tio
n 
tim
e 
(s)
 LP-Chor
 LP-Goldberg
 PriSpectrum [2] - broken
 Troja et al. [17]
 Troja et al. [16]
X: 1e+06
Y: 48
(a) SU Computational Overhead.
10 3 10 4 10 5 10 6
Number of records r
10 -2
10 0
10 2
10 4
10 6
D
B
 e
xe
cu
tio
n 
tim
e 
(s)
 
 LP-Chor
 LP-Goldberg
 PriSpectrum [2] - broken
 Troja et al. [16][17]
X: 1e+06
Y: 1.176e+04
(b) DB Computational Over-
head.
Fig. 4: Computation Comparison
applies to the computation experienced by each DB which
again involves only efficient XOR operations in the proposed
schemes. We illustrate this in Fig. 4b.
We also study the impact of non-responding DBs on the
end-to-end delay experienced by the SU in LP -Goldberg as
illustrated in Fig. 5. This Figure shows that as the number
of faulty DBs increases, the end-to-end delay decreases since
SU needs to process fewer shares to recover the record
Dβ . As opposed to LP -Chor , in LP -Goldberg , SU is still
able to recover the record β even if only k out-of-ℓ DBs
respond. Please recall also that our experiment was performed
on resource constrained VMs to emulate DBs, however in
reality, DBs should have much more powerful computational
resources than of those of the used VMs which will have a
tremendous impact on further reducing the overhead of the
proposed approaches.
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Fig. 5: Impact of the number of faulty DBs on the query RTT.
In terms of communication overhead, most of the ap-
proaches, including LP -Chor and LP -Goldberg , have linear
cost in the number of records in the database as shown
in Table III. What really makes a difference between these
schemes’ communication overheads is the associated constant
factor which could be very large for some protocols. Based
on our experiment and the expressions displayed in Table III,
we plot in Fig. 6, the communication overhead that the
CRN experiences for each private spectrum availability query
issued by SU for the different schemes. The scheme with the
lowest communication overhead is that of Troja et al. [17]
thanks to the use of Gentry et al. PIR [31] which is the
most communication efficient single-server protocol in the
literature having a constant communication overhead. However
this scheme is computationally expensive just like most of
the existing cPIR-based approaches as we show in Fig. 3.
LP -Chor is the second best scheme in terms of communication
overhead but it also provides information theoretic privacy. As
shown in Fig. 6, LP -Chor incurs much lower communication
overhead than LP -Goldberg thanks to the simplicity of the un-
derlying Chor PIR protocol. However, as we discussed earlier,
LP -Goldberg provides additional security features compared
to LP -Chor . XPIR has a relatively high communication over-
head especially for smaller database size but its overhead be-
comes comparable to that of LP -Goldberg when the database’s
size gets larger as shown in Fig. 6. This could be a good
alternative to the cPIR schemes used in the context of CRN s
especially that it introduces much lower latency which is
critical in the context of CRN s. Still, the proposed approaches
have better performance and also provide information-theoretic
privacy to SU s, which shows their practicality in real world.
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Fig. 6: Comparison of the communication overhead of the
different approaches: b = 560 B, k = ℓ, ϑ = 0.
V. RELATED WORK
There are other approaches that address the location pri-
vacy issue in database-driven CRN s. However, for the below
mentioned reasons we decided not to consider them in our
performance analysis. For instance, Zhang et al. [15] rely on
the concept of k-anonymity to make each SU queries DB by
sending a square cloak region that includes its actual location.
k-anonymity guarantees that SU ’s location is indistinguishable
among a set of k points. This could be achieved through the
use of dummy locations by generating k− 1 properly selected
dummy points, and performing k queries to DB , using the
real and dummy locations. Their approach relies on a tradeoff
between providing high location privacy level and maximizing
some utility. This makes it suffer from the fact that achieving
a high location privacy level results in a decrease in spectrum
utility. However, k-anonymity-based approaches cannot achieve
high location privacy without incurring substantial communi-
cation/computation overhead. Furthermore, it has been shown
in a recent study led by Sprint and Technicolor [22] that
anonymization based techniques are not efficient in providing
location privacy guarantees, and may even leak some location
information. Grissa et al [42] propose an information theoretic
approach which could be considered as a variant of the trivial
PIR solution. They achieve this by using set-membership
probabilistic data structures/filters to compress the content of
the database and send it to SU which then needs to try several
combinations of channels and transmission parameters to check
their existence in the data structure. However, LPDB is only
suitable for situations where the structure of the database is
known to SU s which is not always realistic. Also, LPDB
relies on probabilistic data structures which makes it prone to
false positives that can lead to erroneous spectrum availability
decision and cause interference to PU ’s transmission. Zhang et
al. [18] rely on the ǫ-geo-indistinguishability mechanism [43],
derived from differential privacy to protect bilateral location
privacy of both PU s and SU s, which is different from what
we try to achieve in this paper. This mechanism helps SU s
obfuscate their location, however, it introduces noise to SU ’s
location which may impact the accuracy of the spectrum
availability information retrieved.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, with the key observation that database-driven
CRN s contain multiple synchronized DBs having the same
content, we harnessed multi-server PIR techniques to achieve
an optimal location privacy for SU s with high efficiency.
Our analytical and experimental analysis indicate that our
adaptation of multi-server PIR for database-driven CRN s
achieve magnitudes of time faster end-to-end delay compared
to the fastest state-of-the-art single-server PIR adaptation with
an information theoretical privacy guarantee. Specifically, we
adapted two multi-server PIR techniques into CRN settings
as LP -Chor and LP -Goldberg . LP -Chor achieves an end-to-
end delay below a second with high collusion resiliency, while
LP -Goldberg offers fault tolerance and byzantine robustness
with a significantly higher efficiency compared to single-
server PIR based approaches. Given the demonstrated benefits
of multi-server PIR approaches without incurring any extra
architectural overhead on database-driven CRN s, we hope this
work will provide an incentive for the research community
to consider this direction when designing location privacy
preservation protocols for CRN s.
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